Hello, dear friends! Let me thank you both for organizing this conference and for the work you are doing in the campaign to free Boris Kagarlitsky. I hope that he will be able to thank you all in person soon.
The topic of my speech is "Repression plus depoliticization as a single method of suppressing freedom in Russia". I will try to explain how the current regime in Russia is trying to use the political advantages that the passivity and apoliticality of its citizens give it.

Many repressive and dictatorial regimes carry out large-scale political or, at least, ideological mobilization of the population. Citizens are forcibly involved in various propaganda and political actions, they are required to publicly approve of repressions and condemn their victims. This is not a democratic politicization of the masses, it is a compulsion to participate in the actions of a repressive regime. Manipulation with the help of ideology, mutual responsibility and fear allows repressive regimes to keep citizens within strict limits of loyalty. This works especially well if the majority of the population shares the state ideology, at least in its pure form. Let us recall Stalin's USSR. At meetings in work collectives, Soviet citizens were required to condemn recently arrested colleagues, swear allegiance to the party and the state. People who evaded participation in such meetings often became victims of repression themselves.
Nevertheless, in the Stalin era, despite all its cruelty and repression, there were positive grounds for the consolidation of citizens, there were real factors of solidarity. The country was developing, people were united by participation in this development, there were real successes that could not help but support enthusiasm. In addition to the official ideology, there were ideas that could not help but attract, as they were creative and humanistic. Ideas were not enough to make people come together against the repressive system. However, people who took seriously the dreams of a new just society, devoted to communist creation and humanism, could, at least, evaluate what was happening around them, realize the choice that reality put before them, and make it consciously. Repression was not able to destroy reflection and conscience. And if most people chose silence and obedience, then they at least felt the burden and tragedy of this choice and convinced themselves that it was in the name of communism, in the name of the country, for the sake of the family, in the end. The ideas of communism survived the period of repression and were revived during the Khrushchev period, known in Russian history as the Thaw.

In modern Russia, neither the authorities nor the majority of society have a clear ideology, political ideals and principles. This is why a very peculiar Russian model of political repression has developed. Vladimir Putin and his inner circle hate everything mass, do not tolerate any manifestations of social activity, any reminders of the existence and importance of solidarity, therefore, suppressing any public freedoms, they even avoid mass repressions. Today, employees of Russian companies should not shout slogans at meetings, cursing politically unreliable colleagues. Repressions occur silently, media loyal to the authorities report on them sparingly, and they prefer to ignore solidarity campaigns. The majority of society prefers not to notice the repressions at all.

Paradoxically, the modern Russian regime fears even those who support it most passionately and loudly. The right-wing radical Igor Girkin (Strelkov) was convicted not for real crimes, but for his overly ardent and loud support of the so-called special operation. Of course, he harshly criticized the military-political leadership of Russia, but he did so freely, since he ardently supported the leadership in the person of Vladimir Putin and dreamed only of even greater military victories.

Everyone knows about the hysterical and omnipresent Russian propaganda, which the opposition calls "zombifying the population." But what is the goal of this propaganda? Do propagandists strive to inspire the country, motivate people to a common important cause, unite everyone in a patriotic impulse? Nothing of the sort. The main, and perhaps the only goal of propaganda is to keep citizens within the confines of their private lives, to nip in the bud any thoughts of political and civic activity. The ideal picture for the Russian authorities and their ideological servants: a Russian, scared, but proud of his imperial greatness (even if imaginary) must sit in front of the TV, agree with all statements of the authorities (even the most contradictory) and under no circumstances interfere in politics.

The regime does not need real mass support, the Kremlin is also afraid of it, preferring to simply imitate it. The famous mass rallies in honor of the so-called "Crimean Spring" or Vladimir Putin's latest victory in the elections are not organized by enthusiasts and volunteers. Most of those present come either under duress or for a small reward. The Russian authorities treat the people rather unceremoniously, but they are careful in one thing: they are very afraid of pulling the average person out of his sweet political sleep.
The special military operation is not going according to plan at all, Ukrainian troops are on Russian territory. The population is silent, only the parents of conscripts are trying at all costs to prevent their sons from entering the combat zone or to pull out those who have ended up there. “Save our conscripts” – these were the calls that became the first and strongest reaction of Russian society to the invasion of the Kursk region. At the same time, the Russian government does not announce mobilization, the need for which radical patriots constantly scream. On the contrary, Vladimir Putin personally and through his press secretary Dmitry Peskov have repeatedly assured the public that there will be no mobilization, the Russian army has enough fighters.

But does the Russian army really not need reinforcements? The actions of the authorities suggest otherwise. Advertising of military service has been significantly increased, it has become especially catchy and inventive and is placed in many public places. The summer decrees of the president have increased payments to contract soldiers many times over. The Kremlin claims that this measure does not indicate a change in the situation at the front or the emergence of tasks for a military operation, these are simply new measures of social support for servicemen and their families. But this explanation looks dubious, given the current situation with servicemen mobilized in the fall of 2022. They have not yet been dismissed from service, despite the promises of the president and protests from relatives. Another measure to replenish the army: in June of this year, a law was signed on the release from criminal liability of persons who have committed minor and medium-gravity crimes if they sign a contract with the Russian army. The recruitment of prisoners is also continuing at this time.

It seems that mobilization is needed after all, but the authorities have not yet decided to take this step. Of course, if mobilization becomes a matter of life or death for the Russian authorities, it will be carried out. But for now, it can drag it out, the Kremlin is dragging it out, not wanting to irritate the average person. The Kremlin does not have any hope for the patriotic enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of Russians; the authorities treat citizens like philistines, loyal only to their wallets and their families.

This is quite understandable: the current Russian government is itself a collective philistine, it was established as a result of elite collusion and has never had a real ideology. Of course, there is talk about imperial grandeur and traditional values, but all this is intended mainly for official speeches and for propagandists, so that they have something to shout about. Yes, Russians sometimes like to talk about the former greatness of the USSR, about the insolent West and about ungrateful neighbors - former Soviet republics. But there are no stable and mass movements around these ideas, such ideas do not unite people, do not influence their motivation and actions.

The current Russian government does not inspire anyone, it has no supporters, it has either mercenaries and a population submissive due to indifference. Citizens tolerate the government because it promised stability, such was the social contract: stability in exchange for loyalty. And the Kremlin is trying to pretend that this contract is still in force, but in fact it has long been violated. In October, a draft budget was submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, a third of the expenditures of which are military expenses. This looks like a budget for a full-scale war, for which neither the government nor society is ready.

The Kremlin leaves hysterical calls for sacrifices in the name of the Motherland to propagandists, preferring not to stir up the public once again.

This message comes with handouts: a little for pensioners, a little for families with children, huge injections into the military industry, where salaries are growing significantly. This is a carrot for those who understand the rules of the game correctly.

The Russian government instinctively understands that ideas, convictions, sincere enthusiasm make a person free, confident and independent, and for the Russian government this means something terrible - such a person becomes uncontrollable, and therefore dangerous.

By the way, I would like to note that one should not overestimate the passivity of Russians, they are quite capable of speaking out in defense of their private, local rights. Russian society lacks solidarity to protect larger-scale things, such as democracy, freedom of speech, peace, and humane social policy. The Russian government knows this well and can sometimes make concessions to environmentalists or workers of bankrupt enterprises trying to get back their delayed wages. But the Russian government does not forgive the slightest politicization of protest, for which it severely punishes. The Kremlin understands that it has irrevocably violated the promise of stability, and is nervous, guessing a threat in any more or less independent public political action or statement.

Public freethinking is punished, selectively, but constantly. For intellectuals, the authorities have the status of foreign agent, which is used both as a punishment for the obstinate and as a warning: if you don’t like the authorities, leave the country. For those who do not understand the warning and continue to show independence and political activity, more serious repressions are provided, although here too the authorities avoid the mass character they hate.

I know that I offend my colleagues and comrades by declaring the absence of mass repressions in Russia. Let me explain: this is not a statement about the humaneness of the Putin regime, not at all. It’s just that in its hatred of mass movements, the Kremlin goes so far that it prefers to cultivate political passivity, just so as not to unite citizens, even through fear and hatred. Moreover, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle do not want any state structures, in this case the FSB and the police, to become so strong that they become more or less separate from the famous Russian “vertical of power.”

Society cannot fall into a political coma, and the state understands this perfectly well. I repeat: the Kremlin constantly remembers that it has already violated the so-called social contract with citizens about the exchange of obedience and passivity for stability, although it tries to maintain its illusion. Therefore, the authorities preemptively persecute and discredit people who have influence on a more or less wide audience. The authorities consider people whose audience and circle of like-minded people are diverse, differentiated by social status and political views, to be especially dangerous. A striking example is Boris Kagarlitsky. He had influence on a wide variety of audiences: students, regional activists, municipal, regional and even federal deputies who retained some opposition. His arrest was supposed to weaken this influence and send a warning signal to his like-minded people, comrades, students and colleagues.
I see the following logic: opposition-minded people, influential in various circles of Russian society, are persecuted with varying degrees of persistence and severity. The authorities expect that persecution of oppositionists will scare away their audience and supporters, and do not seek, at least for now, to cut off all contacts of arrested oppositionists with society. Political prisoners correspond with followers and comrades, send scientific and journalistic texts from prison. The authorities, it seems, are counting on the magical resource of Russians' passivity and rely on their fear of absurdly harsh sentences for known opponents of the Kremlin.So, I will describe the general logic of Russian repressions.

Firstly, the Kremlin persecutes people with more or less noticeable influence on a diverse audience in order to reduce this influence, and to intimidate the audience and prevent it from growing. Various methods are used to discredit influential oppositionists, the most common being assigning the status of a foreign agent or adding to the list of terrorists and extremists. By the way, these statuses are handed out by the Ministry of Justice and the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, people are deprived of their civil rights without trial, investigation and the opportunity to justify themselves (citizens declared foreign agents are deprived of the right to teach, hold civil service positions, and run for elective office).

Secondly, the authorities are trying to suppress any social self-organization. Propaganda is trying its best to present the opposition as a phenomenon alien to Russian society, which is huddled in the intellectual circles of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and has now moved abroad. This does not correspond to reality, which is confirmed by the actions of the authorities themselves. Political independence and free civil action in the regions are severely punished. Regional leaders and security officials must prove their loyalty to the authorities and their intransigence in the fight against any "sedition". Several times I heard from employees of regional administrations the phrase: "Each region must have its own extremists, otherwise the center will think that we are doing a bad job." And then the Tyumen case and the case of the Ufa Marxists appeared, regional activists are cruelly persecuted, for example, the former coordinator of the Bashkir medical trade union Anton Orlov, the Yakut musician Aikhal Ammosov, the Nizhny Novgorod activist Yuri Chilikin and others.

Fourthly, the civil and political activity of professional communities is suppressed: lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, theatre workers and so on. The tactics of targeted persecution also prevail here, the greatest pressure is exerted on the most active and prominent representatives of these communities. It is enough to recall the case of director Evgenia Berkovich and playwriter Svetlana Petriychuk, who were sentenced to six years in prison for a play about the recruitment of Russian girls to ISIS. Berkovich and Petriychuk were accused of justifying terrorism, although the play has a completely clear anti-terrorist focus. Alexei Navalny's lawyers were subjected to criminal prosecution, and now law enforcement agencies are exerting strong pressure on doctors who signed the demand to investigate the circumstances of Navalny's death. This, by the way, is a manifestation of the fifth feature of Russian political repressions: any hint of a connection with Alexei Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation becomes punishable for any community or individual.

Political repression in Russia is aimed at destroying not just oppositional thinking, but free thinking as such. Even a sleeping and submissive society keeps the government on edge. The regime feels unsure and strives to make its citizens fear it more than it fears them. This fear is not in vain, no resource is infinite, including the resource of apoliticality. Russians understand that the stability promised to them has already disappeared. Military actions are ongoing, people are dying, security is becoming an illusion, and life is becoming more expensive. All this fills the cup of patience of Russians. Sooner or later this cup will overflow.

I would like to quote Boris Kagarlitsky: “When you analyze the current political situation and make predictions, do not remove yourself from the process.” Yes, political activity in Russia is difficult and dangerous now. But we can still help political prisoners, maintain contacts with comrades abroad, engage in political analysis and education. We know that the time of change is approaching, and we are ready to participate in it and influence it. We will not remove ourselves from the process.