Greg Yudin:
'THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE ON OFFER FOR RUSSIA NOW'
The outbreak of the war has ignited considerable global interest in the potential for significant social and political change in Russia. The expectations ranged from a palace coup that would help the elites to get rid of the president and his war that had caught them by surprise, to a popular uprising that would topple the government that sends millions of Russians into meat grinder and destroys the future for the nation.

Nothing of that has materialized so far. This led many to assume that in fact both the masses and the elites in Russia are quite satisfied with the government. After all, as the French pamphleteer Etienne la Boetie argued in the sixteenth century, if the people doesn’t overthrow tyranny, it voluntarily chooses its servitude.

I would like to suggest a different perspective. There can very well be a general dissatisfaction and yet no political action, and this combination is not wholly explained by repressions.

Although repressions do play a significant role – after all, we should not forget that Boris Kagarlitsky is in prison today for a very simple reason: first, he opposes the governments’ decision to start and prosecute this war; second, he was vocal about it publicly. I want to make it very clear to those who may not follow closely the events in Russia: the combination of these two things – opposing the war and saying it publicly almost guarantees that you will be either killed or jailed. In some cases, it takes time for them to reach you, but it is a safe bet that eventually they will.

However, I believe that repressions are not the most important factor for the inaction. There are many people willing to risk and even sacrifice their lives for political change in Russia, and repression alone could never suppress them.

There is a more disturbing explanation, and it relates to the topic of this panel. THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE ON OFFER FOR RUSSIA NOW. And this is genuinely felt by both masses and elites. Contrary to what some people could imagine, current situation is NOT perceived in Russia as a political trade-off for the country, a fateful choice that is being made collectively and that will entail significant consequences. In the absence of alternative, the course of events is perceived as absolutely inevitable and predetermined.

A colleague from Chapel Hill, Graeme Robertson, has recently presented very illuminating study that demonstrates that Russians are extremely keen to engage in what is called in psychology “system justification”. In other words, up to 80% of his respondents are likely to agree with the statements such as “The government is bad but we deserve no better”; “The government is bad but all governments are like this”; “The government is bad but the other one is likely to be even worse”; “The government is bad but it has always been so”, and so on.

IF YOU WANT A WORD TO CHARACTERISE

THE MORAL SITUATIONIN RUSSIA, IT IS DESPAIR.

Despair, resignation, and extreme cynicism – this all sounds familiar to many of you coming from various countries. In this sense, Russia is a quite typical case of neoliberal capitalism that imposes itself as a natural calamity that cannot be resisted, and generates resentment, acrimony, and depoliticization. I would argue that Russia is perhaps the extreme case of this disposition, one that makes people normalize war and destruction and distrust peace and progress.

Now, offering the alternatives is, of course, the job of the opposition. Here, however, in the Russian case we have an ideological problem. Since the invasion of Ukraine began, foreign observers have learned the names of many Russian politicians and activists, most of whom are now in exile and who are usually termed “Russian opposition”. While they have managed to maintain access to Russian audience through social media, and many have shown personal merit, they have yet to articulate a political offer compelling enough to provoke change in their home country.

One of the important reasons why such a proposal was not made is ideological. Most of the figures familiar to foreign eyes represent a particular brand of right-liberalism that emphasizes individual human rights, laissez-faire economy with extremely limited government and catch-up modernization designed to copy the institutional design of Western liberal democracies. This agenda emerged at the time of the proclaimed “end of history” and is strongly associated in Russia with the transformational period of the 1990s, when brutal neoliberal reforms destroyed social safety nets, unleashed unprecedented inequality and elevated organized crime to commanding positions. Many opposition figures reinforce this association by promoting the narrative that in the 1990s Russia was a democracy, albeit imperfect, but Putin turned it into an autocracy. The intuitive plan is to go back to the nineties and not allow power to slide away to authoritarians.

This agenda, no matter how attractive it may be to the West, is a non-starter with the Russian public.
Alexey Navalny was an important exception. He was the one to realize a genuine demand for alternative, which is particularly palpable among Russian youth. While his early flirtations with nationalists were largely irrelevant for his political career, his later projects exploited the sense of extreme injustice widespread in Russian society. Now that Navalny died as a martyr, the task of formulating an alternative is on the shoulders of those who are to replace him.

In the remainder of this talk, I would like to make the case for what could be called a social-democratic alternative for Russia. In doing so, I will be relying on my own studies, which, although conducted before the war, still allow to assess the direction where political demand is evolving, and also on the studies of many colleagues – forgive me if I will not quote from them for the sake of saving time.

  • I will start with what Nancy Fraser has shrewdly noticed in her opening talk: a fresh look at regional and global security is urgently needed. Although the responsibility for unleashing this brutal genocidal war is solely on Vladimir Putin who ignored even the advice of his own flunkies, the blame for the deterioration of the security arrangements he should share with the irresponsible policies of the NATO countries, too. Russians need an understanding that once this war is over, there will be no threats for Russia, no attempts to dismember or humiliate the country (which, of course, does not exclude the political responsibility for the destruction). Russian government was not able to make its population love war, despite all propaganda – there is a clear demand for peace, one that would be sealed with credible security guarantees. A left response is not to repeat “plague on both your houses”, but to craft a new security architecture, one that would overarch the current alliances. Russia should be part of these new arrangements, and mutual security should be guaranteed by the third parties, such as representatives of the Global South. Russia is objectively interested in reforming the UN security bodies and power-sharing. Developing such reforms is the task of the left, and this is the area where cooperation is indispensable.

  • Russia is among global inequality leaders among the big countries: top 1% control 24% of its income and a whopping 48% of its wealth. The war only exacerbates this inequality. Until very recently, Russia was among the very few countries who had a flat tax rate. What is needed is an offer of fair taxation, one that would answer the demand for solidarity that is certainly present in Russia.

  • Welfare state has been gradually dismantled in Russia, and there is a strong demand for restoring it. The situation when treatment for cancer is basically available only in two largest cities is unacceptable. But more importantly, the restoration of the welfare starts with respect to the teachers and healthcare workers. The neoliberal system that made 80% of their salaries depend on their loyalty to their bosses should be liquidated. Professionals’ motivation is trust and respect from society, and their work should be remunerated. Russia clearly has resources for that.

  • There is an overwhelming request for decentralization of the country – which is not to be confused with its disintegration. Reinventing federal structures and installing local self-government will help to let people rule their own land. The level of anger and hatred towards Moscow is excruciating, and profound federalization will be met with enthusiasm.

  • One particular aspect of decentralization is building horizontal infrastructure. After 25 years of oil shower, Putin presides over the country as disconnected as it was before him. Traveling between two Siberian cities often takes making a connection in Moscow. Building roads, railroads, airports is a natural way to draw large investment and unleash the creative potential.

  • There is a palpable demand for more democracy in Russia – which means more self-government. It cannot be answered solely with fair elections. Empowering local councils, introducing civic engagement as part of civic education, experimenting with lotteries – these are all things that are likely to be welcomed in Russia today.

I could go on and on, of course – I haven’t even started talking about the place Russia should take in the Green transition – something it is very advantageously predisposed to do. Comrade from Feminist Anti-War Resistance has made a strong case for reproductive rights, and I would probably add that there is a wide support in Russia for cracking down on domestic violence – something that is artificially suppressed by the current government.

But my point in this talk was to argue that without a clear and coherent social-democratic alternative, the change is unlikely to come. On the other hand, developing such alternative is likely to be met with enthusiasm and support.

Clearly, there can be no such thing as an isolated social-democratic alternative for Russia. What I tried to argue here is that Russia is in many ways a typical, even a radical case of neoliberal capitalism. Developing an alternative for Russia is part of the job of developing a global alternative. But perhaps Russia is, paradoxically, a good place to start – it has a legacy to build on.
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