Thank you. It’s a pleasure to be speaking at this event, in such esteemed company, and to be able to support Boris in this way. To continue this theoretical discussion of imperialism, I want to take up some of the themes discussed by Robert Brenner in his presentation, but I think I have a slightly different perspective on the nature of Russian imperialism. What I propose to do is to use three authors who wrote about imperialism and to look at the Russian case through the lens of three different theories. The first has already been mentioned, that is Lenin's theory. For Lenin, imperialism was ultimately an outgrowth of contradictions and tendencies inherent in capitalism, such as a tendency towards monopoly. The tendency towards overaccumulation of capital drives capital's need for external expansion, and this in itself leads to inter-imperialist rivalries and ultimately world wars.

This is Lenin’s theory in a nutshell. Interestingly, a few years after Lenin published his famous essay on imperialism, the liberal thinker Joseph Schumpeter put forward a kind of liberal interpretation of imperialism in response to Lenin’s theory and the theories of other Second International Marxists such as Rudolf Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg. According to Schumpeter, imperialism is inimical to capitalism, especially capitalism in its pure form, and imperialist impulses represent ideologies and social structures from the pre-capitalist past. This was Schumpeter's major thesis, namely that imperialism is essentially a legacy of the absolutist state and ruling classes and ideologies from the absolutist period.

They survive in a new capitalist era. And this is why states adopt aggressive imperialist policies. For Schumpeter, imperialism could ultimately be compatible with capitalist interests, but it is a sort of artificial combination. And like other liberals, Schumpeter thought that the development of capitalism somehow would lead to the withering away of imperialism and war. So that is the second theory I want to look at. The third theory is that of John Mearsheimer, a contemporary of ours, unlike Lenin and Schumpeter. His main point is that country-specific factors are ultimately irrelevant for this whole discussion; internal capitalist contradictions are irrelevant, and ideologies and social structures are irrelevant because imperialism, or what he calls “great power politics,” stems from the very nature of the international system. In this view, every state struggles for security and makes other states insecure.

Thus inter-imperialist wars are built into the international system. When one state threatens another state, the threatened country will respond with aggressive measures. This is basically inevitable and does not depend on the domestic, social and geological structures in the threatened country. So here we have three kinds of guiding ideas. And we can analyze Russian imperialism using these three perspectives.

I want to start with Mearsheimer because I think this is the easiest sort of case to consider. We can ask whether Russia was actually threatened when it initiated aggression action against Ukraine in 2014. Objectively speaking, Russia was not threatened by NATO. It was not threatened by Western imperialism. The major argument for the proposition that Russia and its security interests were somehow threatened by the West is the expansion of NATO.

But this should be seen in the context of actual developments on the ground, which demonstrate that NATO was in fact becoming weaker as a conventional military alliance. It was expanding, but it was also becoming weaker. This chart shows that NATO armies were becoming smaller, and America was withdrawing its troops from Europe. Back in the 80s, there were 300,000 American soldiers in Western Europe, and by 2014 it was something like 30,000, or ten times fewer. And it’s the same story with equipment. The chart comes from a report published by the Rand Corporation, a US national security think tank. The report states that Russia was, in fact, becoming stronger than NATO in the specific Eastern European potential theater of war.

Mearsheimer himself actually admitted this fact. In his famous or infamous article in 2014, he stated that NATO was expanding, but that it was also very careful not to provoke or threaten Russia in terms of conventional military strength. But he went on to make an interesting argument. He said that it doesn't matter that NATO was not objectively a threat. What matters is that Russia felt threatened, so the Kremlin perceived the situation as threatening. But this is a different argument, of course. It's not about objective developments anymore. It is about perceptions and, therefore, about ideology.

So I think that Mearsheimer's theory is actually the weakest of the three theories we are looking at in terms of explaining Russian imperialism. Then we have Lenin, and this theory is actually stronger, in my opinion. We can see the emergence of certain criteria for imperialism in Russia in the post-Soviet period, especially during the period of economic recovery in the 2000s and the early 2010s. The criteria that Robert Brenner already mentioned began to appear in Russia: the concentration of capital, capitalist monopolies, the over accumulation of capital, and the need for external expansion. So I think this was all present in Russia in the 2000s. Russian companies were extremely interested in post-Soviet countries because they could rebuild Soviet-era supply chains under their control. They could benefit from those old Soviet industrial economic ties.

And they also sought new markets in post-Soviet countries. This economic expansion created pressure for political assertiveness as well. I would argue that any Russian government, and not just Putin's government, would feel some pressure to be more assertive, maybe even more aggressive, in the post-Soviet space because of the needs of capital accumulation. So this argument is valid to a certain extent. But at the same time, what is different from the pre-1914 period, for example, is that Russia was integrated into global capitalism in a very specific way. On the one hand, it was quite influential in its region, the post-Soviet region. On the other hand, Russian capitalism was a dependent form of capitalism. In fact, it's dependent on Western centres of capital accumulation. And so Russia was in an intermediate position: a classic case of semi-periphery.

The impetus could only come from outside the economic sphere, probably from the political sphere. So the impulse not just towards imperialism, but towards a specific form of imperialism that would not only break with the West but engage in this extreme confrontation with the West, could only come from elsewhere, not from Russian capitalism, because Russian capitalism really benefited from the way it was integrated into the global economy. And the Russian ruling class derived huge benefits from this intermediate position, or what we could call its sub-imperialist position, in post-Soviet countries, where Russian corporations were very influential and sometimes even dominant.

At the same time, Russian corporations had deep ties with Western companies and Western centres of capital accumulation. In fact, western capital was exploiting the post-Soviet region through Russian capital—not directly, but through Russian capital. And this is the essence of a sub-imperialist position. So, speaking strictly in economic terms, that was the essence of Russia's global integration.

In sum, Lenin's theory goes some of the way towards explaining Russian imperialism, but not all the way, in my opinion. Then we have Schumpeter, who offers not just a non-Marxist explanation, but to some extent an anti-Marxist explanation. Nevertheless, I think it is compelling in some respects, because Schumpeter emphasizes historical elements in imperialist policy.

He sees it as a kind of revenge of the past. And if we look at Russia's imperialist discourses we find in them an echo of the Soviet and especially the imperial past. The arguments that the Kremlin uses and that Putin uses resemble the arguments of the Russian Empire and specific ideological tropes about how Ukrainian identity was somehow invented by foreign intelligence specifically to weaken and destroy Russia. All that was already present some 120 years ago.

And these discourses have made their reappearance in Russian politics. So the idea that Russian imperialism is a product of the past is compelling. One obvious argument is that Putin is preoccupied with the past. He is constantly reading history books, and his obsession with Russia's place in history and his own place in history is evident in his thinking, in his public speeches, and in the articles that he publishes. In terms of ideology, the influence of the past is very clear. But then there's the question of Putin’s transformation from a cynical materialist into an ideological imperialist. Why did he suddenly develop this interest in historical ideas? For me, that points to limitations of Schumpeter's theory as it doesn't really explain how the past reasserted itself in the present in Russia.

I think that the explanation ultimately lies in contemporary events and not just some kind of metaphysical revenge of the past. More specifically, the Kremlin’s ideology is based on the experience of primitive accumulation in the 1990s, when people, including Putin, participated in a kind of dog-eat-dog free for all in which you need to be on the offensive all the time or else you will be destroyed by your competitors. This was the essence of Russian capitalism in the 1990s, and this kind of experience was projected by the Kremlin elites onto the world stage. In Putin’s view, the world works just like Russian capitalism in the 90s: it's the Wild West. You cannot show weakness. You need to take the offensive at every opportunity, and you can never bluff. Bluffing is a sign of weakness, and weakness means you will be destroyed. Based on this kind of experience and habitus, to borrow Bourdieu’s term, the ideology was fashioned after the Kremlin was radicalized by the Arab Spring and by the colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space.

The Kremlin felt threatened by these events, and they interpreted them as an attack by the West—not as genuine popular protests, but as something inspired by the West in order to weaken these countries and destroy these political regimes. The conclusion was that the West is plotting the same thing against Russia, and so the Kremlin needs to strike first in order to neutralize the threat of a colour revolution or something similar to the Arab Spring. And these were the triggers that dredged up those discourses and ideologies from the past and made them so relevant to the Kremlin in the present moment.

This ultimately explains the ideological consolidation of the Kremlin. In my opinion, ideology is the crucial factor in Russia's aggression in 2014 and 2022. It cannot be accounted for simply with reference to objective contradictions, such as the contradictions of capital accumulation or geopolitical contradictions. By themselves they cannot explain the Kremlin’s decisions and actions, such as the decision to annex Crimea or the decision to invade Ukraine. Ultimately, the explanation lies in the sphere of ideology.
This argument is based on reliable sources, and I’ve just summarized some of the points made in a book I am nearly finished writing with Ilya Budraitskis on Russian imperialism.

Thank you so much.

QUESTIONS

Tanya Marquette: I really appreciated the comments about the ideology that affects Putin's and Russian thinking. I think that's really quite critical. And it's something that I don't think Americans understand, at least the people that I know and talk with. But my question pertains to a lot of what Hanna Perekhoda was talking about. While she was focusing on the problems with Russia and the repression and problems there, what I didn't hear was any recognition of what is very much part of at least some progressive Americans’ thinking, namely the significance and importance in Ukraine of their very right wing leaders. Their Nazi movement was well documented for its violence against the Russians in the Donbas region. And I don't know if people here have contradictory information, but the US was very critical in supporting that. They supported a coup in Ukraine. As you know, Victoria Nuland put in her choice for the American oligarchs, and a lot of what, many of us saw happening in Ukraine was the US really pushing Ukraine to function as a proxy for a US-American war against Russia. So I would like to hear some other people's comments on that.

Francis King: Very interesting set of presentations and, very important issues. Regarding the various theories of imperialism that Ilya was going through, I think it's probably useful to concentrate more on Schumpeter's theory, but I think more generally we have to recognize that Marxists have been very bad at recognizing historically that nationalism is important. It's an important motivator that goes beyond class and it goes beyond immediate economic interests. It was important in the various Ukrainian colour revolutions in 2006, 2014, etc. It's also important in Russia. And when the Soviet Union broke up, the Russian nation, as it perceived itself, found itself scattered not among all 15 republics equally, but over an area that did not correspond to the borders of the Russian Federation. If you'd have asked any Russians prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union where Russia is you would not have got a description that corresponded to the borders of the RSFSR. It simply wasn't conceived like that. And so you have a situation where a lot of the so-called peripheral nations and states are trying to define themselves as nations, and necessarily doing so in opposition to the Russian nation to a greater or lesser extent. And since Russia is itself a resurgent state that is increasingly embittered, you're kind of setting yourself up for this sort of situation. Certainly we shouldn't ignore economic and other factors in analysing what's going on. But I think it's important to put nationalism, if not in the very centre of the analysis, then at least quite close to it, because if you don't include it, it doesn't make sense.

Art Young: First, a tremendous thank you. I can't begin to imagine all the complexities that you've had to overcome to put together such a really valuable and memorable experience. I'd just like to note that what we're doing here is extending the practice of an injury to one is an injury to all in the sense that, if we look around the names that we see on the screen, we're acutely aware that within this gathering there are some very sharp differences of opinion, for example, on the issue of what position to take vis à vis Russia's invasion of Ukraine and what is the way forward. There are those who agree with Kagarlitsky’s worldview and others who do not, including his views of what happened back in 2014, which it seems he still holds. I do not share the views he held at that time, and I look forward to a time when we when Boris will be able to discuss them with us. But what we're doing here is coming together to defend the right to hold these views, whether or not we agree with them, and to oppose the rising tide of rightist repression, not only in Russia but worldwide. That's a big achievement. Obviously the seminar was not designed to hold a thorough discussion of our view of the war in Ukraine, but it's also a healthy reflection that] we can simply raise those differences and still come together in defence of Boris and the many other victims of political repression. I will comment very briefly on the substance of those differences. One thing that disturbs me in most of these debates is that not much weight is given to the viewpoint of leftists—Marxists in Ukraine and in Russia—on the war. I think we need to thank the participants here who have laid out their views, and we do not need to agree automatically with the viewpoint of any individual, because they may be from Ukraine or from Russia, or fighting for progress. But I think I have heard far too many Western socialists and leftists to my liking compared to the small number of Ukrainian and Russian Marxists, socialists and leftists. I don't have any complaint about listening to and considering the viewpoints of those who come from countries like Canada with the United States, I just deplore the lack of balance and the fact that there's insufficient attention given to how workers, socialists, for example, in Ukraine, are combating the right-wing neoliberal Zelensky government at the same time that they're taking up arms to resist the Russian invasion. So I'll just finish with that. I think that, because of his prominence, Kagarlitsky is able to break through some of this imbalance and get his point of view out there. And I salute him for the tremendous risks that he has taken to communicate his point of view that it's in the interest of the Russian working class, the Ukrainian nation and the working class internationally that Russia be defeated in this war. I think that's something all of us should give some serious consideration to. Thank you.

ANSWER
Ilya Matveev: I will be very brief. I will just answer two questions and respond to two points. The first one is about the role of the United States in Ukraine and this idea of America supposedly pushing Ukraine to elect a right-wing government and become a proxy state. I think the American role in our region—not just in Ukraine, but in the post-Soviet region—is dramatically exaggerated. Russian aggression against Ukraine has never been about the United States, and American influence on Ukrainian politics is dramatically exaggerated. In my opinion, Ukrainian internal developments are much more important. And the Russian role is paramount. There was some American influence, but it played a much smaller role than internal developments and Russian influence. So I think that there is a rather distorted view. If you look at the situation from the United States, it may seem that the American role was quite major, but I think this is a bias generated by American media.

As for the second comment, I agree completely that nationalism plays a crucial role in this whole situation, and especially the rebirth of imperial nationalism in Russia. It's not just a question of imperialism creating colonies, dependencies and a kind of informal empire; it's also about nationalism because for the Kremlin Ukrainians are part of the Russian nation, and this is part of the nationalist discourse; it's part of the nationalist imaginary that is combined with imperialism. The thinking is that we need to crush Ukrainian sovereignty and Ukraine as a country, because Ukrainians, in fact, belong to Russia and are part of the unitary Russian nation. But the question remains, why did the Kremlin become so nationalist? Because if we look at the Kremlin in the 2000s, it was an extremely pragmatic institution. They were pragmatists, and everyone saw them as kleptocrats, interested only in money, in enriching themselves, and in material privileges. And then somehow they became these ideological nationalists, imperialist nationalists. So this is an interesting question, a kind of a paradox, and all I can say here is that we try to answer this question in the book we are writing with Ilya Budraitskis, which should be out soon. Thank you so much.