Robert Brenner:
'THE MOST EXTREME CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM COME FROM THE DESTRUCTION AND DISPLACEMENT OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION'
'THE MOST EXTREME CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM COME FROM THE DESTRUCTION AND DISPLACEMENT OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION'
The topic I was assigned is imperialism today. My argument is that the theory of imperialism put forward by Lenin in 1916 to end World War One remains, if properly qualified, the best point of departure for understanding imperialism today.
Lenin's theory was profoundly historical, and this is its strength. And I think that's why this theory, this little pamphlet, constantly criticized and surpassed, remains a very good place to start for understanding imperialism today. It was designed to understand the operation of the international capitalist system at a certain phase of its development, namely the first decades of the 20th century. Still, I would say that it provides a surprisingly powerful conceptual framework, addressing not only Lenin's epoch, but our own. It's about understanding the system as a whole, and that's its strength.
Lenin famously defined the capitalist system at the moment of imperialism that he was looking at in terms of five defining traits which emerged as an expression of international competition, or international rivalry. Looking at this material historically, we can see that what Lenin is talking about is a division of the world between one country that develops earlier, which we might call a hegemon, and those that develop later. The characteristics of each have to do with their functional requirements for reproducing international leadership on the one hand, and challenging that leadership on the other.
The first go round of this system is in the late 19th- early 20th with the UK as the hegemon and the United States, Germany and Japan following behind. Later in the 20th century -early 21st century the advanced capitalist countries include Germany, Japan and East Asia, with the United States as the hegemon.
That's the basic picture that we get from Lenin, with one further very important qualification. Lenin is talking about Inter-capitalist relations among advanced capitalist countries. Equally important from the standpoint of the picture that we want to draw is that the agents within these frameworks, both late 19th, early and late 20th century, are further defined by their relationship with the “indigenous population.”
A hugely important determinant of the form of development is its relationship to the underlying population. It's not just an imperial power but a settler imperial power. The most extreme characteristics of American imperialism come from the relationship to the indigenous population and its destruction and displacement.
The institutional arrangements that we're talking about are also forged, in part, from international rivalry. Here you have the earlier developers versus the later developers, with an important distinction between the two based on the vicious military political character of the advanced capitalist countries. You cannot understand the global regime without grasping that difference.
Lenin's theory was profoundly historical, and this is its strength. And I think that's why this theory, this little pamphlet, constantly criticized and surpassed, remains a very good place to start for understanding imperialism today. It was designed to understand the operation of the international capitalist system at a certain phase of its development, namely the first decades of the 20th century. Still, I would say that it provides a surprisingly powerful conceptual framework, addressing not only Lenin's epoch, but our own. It's about understanding the system as a whole, and that's its strength.
Lenin famously defined the capitalist system at the moment of imperialism that he was looking at in terms of five defining traits which emerged as an expression of international competition, or international rivalry. Looking at this material historically, we can see that what Lenin is talking about is a division of the world between one country that develops earlier, which we might call a hegemon, and those that develop later. The characteristics of each have to do with their functional requirements for reproducing international leadership on the one hand, and challenging that leadership on the other.
The first go round of this system is in the late 19th- early 20th with the UK as the hegemon and the United States, Germany and Japan following behind. Later in the 20th century -early 21st century the advanced capitalist countries include Germany, Japan and East Asia, with the United States as the hegemon.
That's the basic picture that we get from Lenin, with one further very important qualification. Lenin is talking about Inter-capitalist relations among advanced capitalist countries. Equally important from the standpoint of the picture that we want to draw is that the agents within these frameworks, both late 19th, early and late 20th century, are further defined by their relationship with the “indigenous population.”
A hugely important determinant of the form of development is its relationship to the underlying population. It's not just an imperial power but a settler imperial power. The most extreme characteristics of American imperialism come from the relationship to the indigenous population and its destruction and displacement.
The institutional arrangements that we're talking about are also forged, in part, from international rivalry. Here you have the earlier developers versus the later developers, with an important distinction between the two based on the vicious military political character of the advanced capitalist countries. You cannot understand the global regime without grasping that difference.
What I want to do is take Lenin's theory of imperialism and apply it to the post-World War 2 world, hopefully bringing it up to our own time by revealing the basic outcome of the fight for international hegemony. This international rivalry imprints itself on both leaders and followers.
Lenin talked about concentration of production and capital, the merging of bank and industrial capital, trade production, the domestic market, the formation of international monopolies and colonies. What you can see here is you have a field of natural selection. Surviving through this capitalist competition is the road in which later developers travel through these ever more elaborate set of institutional arrangements. That is true for the hegemon as well as for those countries that follow.
Lenin talked about concentration of production and capital, the merging of bank and industrial capital, trade production, the domestic market, the formation of international monopolies and colonies. What you can see here is you have a field of natural selection. Surviving through this capitalist competition is the road in which later developers travel through these ever more elaborate set of institutional arrangements. That is true for the hegemon as well as for those countries that follow.
From the standpoint of the leader, the hegemon, the opportunity was there to advance by trade and foreign direct investment without that massive set of institutional arrangements, often relying on the institutions that were underlyingly created or produced in what became the colonized world, for example, in Latin America. On the one hand is the set of institutional arrangements designed to catch up, challenge and reproduce the hegemony, But these are also arrangements that weaken the older hegemon.
So with that in mind, I want to take the story to the postwar world and the second round of what I'm talking about, which would be American hegemony. I'm going to have to scant a great deal what needs to be said, but I hope I can bring out the important points.
After World War Two, American hegemony emerged and was totally dominant in every sphere. It had the power to impose its will across the board. It was able to take the form of hegemony that the British exercised in the late 19th century vis a vis the US, Germany and Japan and impose it on the rest of the world in a very extreme form.
While international diplomacy and war was in the hands of the United States hegemon, its power also created conditions for the rapid development in those follower countries most agile in transforming property relations to develop. Not every country could “play” the game. The successful followership “players” were countries that could constitute capitalist social property relations, what Marx characterized as primitive accumulation.
Probably without the background of the Cold War, without the pressures to confront the Soviet Union, the US wouldn’t have had the motivation to see to the economic development of its own allies. But that in turn led to a problem: the flip side of this transformation opened the door to decline of the hegemon. The advantage of coming early to development turned bit by bit to a disadvantage, especially given the US role of being the international policeman. The division of functions taken on by the hegemon threatened to leave the hegemon in the lurch.
This was the story of the first part of the post-war period, where you have rapid development on the part of the later developing Japanese, Germans and then East Asians. This is the dilemma that is imposed by the structure. It works too well for the hegemon and for the followers, because the hegemon finds itself ever less able to rival the followers. What we find is that starting in the 1970s,and revving up in the ‘80s, is a reshaping of international institutions in order to enable the hegemon to function without being eclipsed. In my opinion it’s quite a spectacular adjustment that leaves U.S. hegemony even more entrenched than before.
I think this picture explains early 21st century developments. But where does Russia fit into this picture?
The Russian case is one of extremely late development burdened with non-capitalist institutions, so it is necessary for this particularly non-capitalist formation to devise a way to catch up in international competition. As a result, it’s a very cramped, politically dependent form of development.
I would say that the way to see contemporary Russia is that you have a late developer without having much in the way of fully developed capitalist institutions, so it has to use political instrumentalities to catch up.
So with that in mind, I want to take the story to the postwar world and the second round of what I'm talking about, which would be American hegemony. I'm going to have to scant a great deal what needs to be said, but I hope I can bring out the important points.
After World War Two, American hegemony emerged and was totally dominant in every sphere. It had the power to impose its will across the board. It was able to take the form of hegemony that the British exercised in the late 19th century vis a vis the US, Germany and Japan and impose it on the rest of the world in a very extreme form.
While international diplomacy and war was in the hands of the United States hegemon, its power also created conditions for the rapid development in those follower countries most agile in transforming property relations to develop. Not every country could “play” the game. The successful followership “players” were countries that could constitute capitalist social property relations, what Marx characterized as primitive accumulation.
Probably without the background of the Cold War, without the pressures to confront the Soviet Union, the US wouldn’t have had the motivation to see to the economic development of its own allies. But that in turn led to a problem: the flip side of this transformation opened the door to decline of the hegemon. The advantage of coming early to development turned bit by bit to a disadvantage, especially given the US role of being the international policeman. The division of functions taken on by the hegemon threatened to leave the hegemon in the lurch.
This was the story of the first part of the post-war period, where you have rapid development on the part of the later developing Japanese, Germans and then East Asians. This is the dilemma that is imposed by the structure. It works too well for the hegemon and for the followers, because the hegemon finds itself ever less able to rival the followers. What we find is that starting in the 1970s,and revving up in the ‘80s, is a reshaping of international institutions in order to enable the hegemon to function without being eclipsed. In my opinion it’s quite a spectacular adjustment that leaves U.S. hegemony even more entrenched than before.
I think this picture explains early 21st century developments. But where does Russia fit into this picture?
The Russian case is one of extremely late development burdened with non-capitalist institutions, so it is necessary for this particularly non-capitalist formation to devise a way to catch up in international competition. As a result, it’s a very cramped, politically dependent form of development.
I would say that the way to see contemporary Russia is that you have a late developer without having much in the way of fully developed capitalist institutions, so it has to use political instrumentalities to catch up.
IN THIS SENSE, PUTIN CANNOT SIMPLY ADOPT A SET OF CAPITALIST INSTITUTIONS AND THEREFORE MUST FORGOT THE CLASSICAL DEVELOPMENT ROAD, AND IS CONSEQUENTLY DRIVEN TOWARD A POLITICALLY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT WITH WARFARE AT ITS CENTER.
The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is an artificial attempt to solve the problem of backwardness through a particularly backward means.
It is not particularly surprising that it's not successful. I'm looking forward to what Ilya has to say about this, but to me, it's leading inexorably to domestic crisis, which will most likely lead to hypertrophy of the same form rather than transformation. I'll stop there.
QUESTIONS
Tanya Marquette: I really appreciated the comments about the ideology that affects Putin's and Russian thinking. I think that's really quite critical. And it's something that I don't think Americans understand, at least the people that I know and talk with. But my question pertains to a lot of what Hanna Perekhoda was talking about. While she was focusing on the problems with Russia and the repression and problems there, what I didn't hear was any recognition of what is very much part of at least some progressive Americans’ thinking, namely the significance and importance in Ukraine of their very right wing leaders. Their Nazi movement was well documented for its violence against the Russians in the Donbas region. And I don't know if people here have contradictory information, but the US was very critical in supporting that. They supported a coup in Ukraine. As you know, Victoria Nuland put in her choice for the American oligarchs, and a lot of what, many of us saw happening in Ukraine was the US really pushing Ukraine to function as a proxy for a US-American war against Russia. So I would like to hear some other people's comments on that.
Francis King: Very interesting set of presentations and, very important issues. Regarding the various theories of imperialism that Ilya was going through, I think it's probably useful to concentrate more on Schumpeter's theory, but I think more generally we have to recognize that Marxists have been very bad at recognizing historically that nationalism is important. It's an important motivator that goes beyond class and it goes beyond immediate economic interests. It was important in the various Ukrainian colour revolutions in 2006, 2014, etc. It's also important in Russia. And when the Soviet Union broke up, the Russian nation, as it perceived itself, found itself scattered not among all 15 republics equally, but over an area that did not correspond to the borders of the Russian Federation. If you'd have asked any Russians prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union where Russia is you would not have got a description that corresponded to the borders of the RSFSR. It simply wasn't conceived like that. And so you have a situation where a lot of the so-called peripheral nations and states are trying to define themselves as nations, and necessarily doing so in opposition to the Russian nation to a greater or lesser extent. And since Russia is itself a resurgent state that is increasingly embittered, you're kind of setting yourself up for this sort of situation. Certainly we shouldn't ignore economic and other factors in analysing what's going on. But I think it's important to put nationalism, if not in the very centre of the analysis, then at least quite close to it, because if you don't include it, it doesn't make sense.
Art Young: First, a tremendous thank you. I can't begin to imagine all the complexities that you've had to overcome to put together such a really valuable and memorable experience. I'd just like to note that what we're doing here is extending the practice of an injury to one is an injury to all in the sense that, if we look around the names that we see on the screen, we're acutely aware that within this gathering there are some very sharp differences of opinion, for example, on the issue of what position to take vis à vis Russia's invasion of Ukraine and what is the way forward. There are those who agree with Kagarlitsky’s worldview and others who do not, including his views of what happened back in 2014, which it seems he still holds. I do not share the views he held at that time, and I look forward to a time when Boris will be able to discuss them with us. But what we're doing here is coming together to defend the right to hold these views, whether or not we agree with them, and to oppose the rising tide of rightist repression, not only in Russia but worldwide. That's a big achievement. Obviously, the seminar was not designed to hold a thorough discussion of our view of the war in Ukraine, but it's also a healthy reflection that] we can simply raise those differences and still come together in defence of Boris and the many other victims of political repression.
I will comment very briefly on the substance of those differences. One thing that disturbs me in most of these debates is that not much weight is given to the viewpoint of leftists—Marxists in Ukraine and in Russia—on the war. I think we need to thank the participants here who have laid out their views, and we do not need to agree automatically with the viewpoint of any individual, because they may be from Ukraine or from Russia, or fighting for progress. But I think I have heard far too many Western socialists and leftists to my liking compared to the small number of Ukrainian and Russian Marxists, socialists and leftists. I don't have any complaint about listening to and considering the viewpoints of those who come from countries like Canada with the United States, I just deplore the lack of balance and the fact that there's insufficient attention given to how workers, socialists, for example, in Ukraine, are combating the right-wing neoliberal Zelensky government at the same time that they're taking up arms to resist the Russian invasion.
So, I'll just finish with that. I think that, because of his prominence, Kagarlitsky is able to break through some of this imbalance and get his point of view out there. And I salute him for the tremendous risks that he has taken to communicate his point of view that it's in the interest of the Russian working class, the Ukrainian nation and the working class internationally that Russia be defeated in this war. I think that's something all of us should give some serious consideration to. Thank you.
ANSWER
Robert Brenner: I'll be brief. I would just say to conclude my own presentation, or elaborate it a bit further in the one area that is scanted here because of the rightful and obvious emphasis on Russian imperialism, which would be US and US imperialism. The theme that I was developing was twofold and self-contradictory: the standpoint is about US decline in the international system, which should be the parallel to the dynamism of later developing countries, particularly Germany, then Japan, and now China. I think that US decline has been a huge theme, and it's one that the left has gladly bought into. In my opinion, it's long overdue to revise that theme and see how desperately inadequate it is. I have to say, I partook of the same tendency to look at this international system through a Trotskyist line of uneven and combined development with later developers as the most advanced, and statist and early developers as free market and reactionary. The problem with that today, it seems to me, is that the dominant. …
I'll end here because I think this is where I'd like to hear more. I guess there won't be more discussion in this panel, but there needs to be much more discussion. Is that the US, unlike most other places, even the UK, which was the first leading country to go through the syndrome and did to some degree respond to it, it did not simply accept the climb, especially after World War two. There was, following with the labor governments in the world, some attempt to cut off that development before it completed itself in the US case. It's much more prominent because I see no reason. I mean we all need to be educated on this stuff. It seems to me that by far, the US has not. I mean, after a period where it looked like the kind of structure of decline was the way to grasp American developments, on the one hand, the decline and on the other hand, world imperial dominance. They went together perfectly well from this standpoint. But I think that that was actually cut short and that to an important degree, despite a “free market” capitalism, free market ideology, as reactionary and as awful a ruling class as you can imagine.
Nonetheless, you have, by the time of the Biden administration, a critically important turn back toward a counter decline and toward state support for development. Not extreme, but nonetheless very noticeable. And that has, in effect, I think, put paid to any idea that decline is adequate for characterizing the American trajectory. And it's worse than that, because while decline is not adequate to characterize the American trajectory, what has the intervening variable that has made possible the reversal of decline? Reversal of decline, the standpoint of the dominant elites, is their embrace of an anti-China politics, which has allowed for a political-ideological justification for “Reindustrialization.” So a remerger, if you will, of industry and military as the way to counter American decline in a way that could be helpful, that could be of some use to the American working class because it’s been so long that development has taken place and productivity growth has been so low. Wages, real wages have been flat forever. So there's some shift in that way. But I think it's a very it's a thick read for the American ruling class, a very thin read for the American working class, if that makes any sense. Thanks.
It is not particularly surprising that it's not successful. I'm looking forward to what Ilya has to say about this, but to me, it's leading inexorably to domestic crisis, which will most likely lead to hypertrophy of the same form rather than transformation. I'll stop there.
QUESTIONS
Tanya Marquette: I really appreciated the comments about the ideology that affects Putin's and Russian thinking. I think that's really quite critical. And it's something that I don't think Americans understand, at least the people that I know and talk with. But my question pertains to a lot of what Hanna Perekhoda was talking about. While she was focusing on the problems with Russia and the repression and problems there, what I didn't hear was any recognition of what is very much part of at least some progressive Americans’ thinking, namely the significance and importance in Ukraine of their very right wing leaders. Their Nazi movement was well documented for its violence against the Russians in the Donbas region. And I don't know if people here have contradictory information, but the US was very critical in supporting that. They supported a coup in Ukraine. As you know, Victoria Nuland put in her choice for the American oligarchs, and a lot of what, many of us saw happening in Ukraine was the US really pushing Ukraine to function as a proxy for a US-American war against Russia. So I would like to hear some other people's comments on that.
Francis King: Very interesting set of presentations and, very important issues. Regarding the various theories of imperialism that Ilya was going through, I think it's probably useful to concentrate more on Schumpeter's theory, but I think more generally we have to recognize that Marxists have been very bad at recognizing historically that nationalism is important. It's an important motivator that goes beyond class and it goes beyond immediate economic interests. It was important in the various Ukrainian colour revolutions in 2006, 2014, etc. It's also important in Russia. And when the Soviet Union broke up, the Russian nation, as it perceived itself, found itself scattered not among all 15 republics equally, but over an area that did not correspond to the borders of the Russian Federation. If you'd have asked any Russians prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union where Russia is you would not have got a description that corresponded to the borders of the RSFSR. It simply wasn't conceived like that. And so you have a situation where a lot of the so-called peripheral nations and states are trying to define themselves as nations, and necessarily doing so in opposition to the Russian nation to a greater or lesser extent. And since Russia is itself a resurgent state that is increasingly embittered, you're kind of setting yourself up for this sort of situation. Certainly we shouldn't ignore economic and other factors in analysing what's going on. But I think it's important to put nationalism, if not in the very centre of the analysis, then at least quite close to it, because if you don't include it, it doesn't make sense.
Art Young: First, a tremendous thank you. I can't begin to imagine all the complexities that you've had to overcome to put together such a really valuable and memorable experience. I'd just like to note that what we're doing here is extending the practice of an injury to one is an injury to all in the sense that, if we look around the names that we see on the screen, we're acutely aware that within this gathering there are some very sharp differences of opinion, for example, on the issue of what position to take vis à vis Russia's invasion of Ukraine and what is the way forward. There are those who agree with Kagarlitsky’s worldview and others who do not, including his views of what happened back in 2014, which it seems he still holds. I do not share the views he held at that time, and I look forward to a time when Boris will be able to discuss them with us. But what we're doing here is coming together to defend the right to hold these views, whether or not we agree with them, and to oppose the rising tide of rightist repression, not only in Russia but worldwide. That's a big achievement. Obviously, the seminar was not designed to hold a thorough discussion of our view of the war in Ukraine, but it's also a healthy reflection that] we can simply raise those differences and still come together in defence of Boris and the many other victims of political repression.
I will comment very briefly on the substance of those differences. One thing that disturbs me in most of these debates is that not much weight is given to the viewpoint of leftists—Marxists in Ukraine and in Russia—on the war. I think we need to thank the participants here who have laid out their views, and we do not need to agree automatically with the viewpoint of any individual, because they may be from Ukraine or from Russia, or fighting for progress. But I think I have heard far too many Western socialists and leftists to my liking compared to the small number of Ukrainian and Russian Marxists, socialists and leftists. I don't have any complaint about listening to and considering the viewpoints of those who come from countries like Canada with the United States, I just deplore the lack of balance and the fact that there's insufficient attention given to how workers, socialists, for example, in Ukraine, are combating the right-wing neoliberal Zelensky government at the same time that they're taking up arms to resist the Russian invasion.
So, I'll just finish with that. I think that, because of his prominence, Kagarlitsky is able to break through some of this imbalance and get his point of view out there. And I salute him for the tremendous risks that he has taken to communicate his point of view that it's in the interest of the Russian working class, the Ukrainian nation and the working class internationally that Russia be defeated in this war. I think that's something all of us should give some serious consideration to. Thank you.
ANSWER
Robert Brenner: I'll be brief. I would just say to conclude my own presentation, or elaborate it a bit further in the one area that is scanted here because of the rightful and obvious emphasis on Russian imperialism, which would be US and US imperialism. The theme that I was developing was twofold and self-contradictory: the standpoint is about US decline in the international system, which should be the parallel to the dynamism of later developing countries, particularly Germany, then Japan, and now China. I think that US decline has been a huge theme, and it's one that the left has gladly bought into. In my opinion, it's long overdue to revise that theme and see how desperately inadequate it is. I have to say, I partook of the same tendency to look at this international system through a Trotskyist line of uneven and combined development with later developers as the most advanced, and statist and early developers as free market and reactionary. The problem with that today, it seems to me, is that the dominant. …
I'll end here because I think this is where I'd like to hear more. I guess there won't be more discussion in this panel, but there needs to be much more discussion. Is that the US, unlike most other places, even the UK, which was the first leading country to go through the syndrome and did to some degree respond to it, it did not simply accept the climb, especially after World War two. There was, following with the labor governments in the world, some attempt to cut off that development before it completed itself in the US case. It's much more prominent because I see no reason. I mean we all need to be educated on this stuff. It seems to me that by far, the US has not. I mean, after a period where it looked like the kind of structure of decline was the way to grasp American developments, on the one hand, the decline and on the other hand, world imperial dominance. They went together perfectly well from this standpoint. But I think that that was actually cut short and that to an important degree, despite a “free market” capitalism, free market ideology, as reactionary and as awful a ruling class as you can imagine.
Nonetheless, you have, by the time of the Biden administration, a critically important turn back toward a counter decline and toward state support for development. Not extreme, but nonetheless very noticeable. And that has, in effect, I think, put paid to any idea that decline is adequate for characterizing the American trajectory. And it's worse than that, because while decline is not adequate to characterize the American trajectory, what has the intervening variable that has made possible the reversal of decline? Reversal of decline, the standpoint of the dominant elites, is their embrace of an anti-China politics, which has allowed for a political-ideological justification for “Reindustrialization.” So a remerger, if you will, of industry and military as the way to counter American decline in a way that could be helpful, that could be of some use to the American working class because it’s been so long that development has taken place and productivity growth has been so low. Wages, real wages have been flat forever. So there's some shift in that way. But I think it's a very it's a thick read for the American ruling class, a very thin read for the American working class, if that makes any sense. Thanks.
